

APPENDIX A: Prospects for interest rates

- 1 The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Link provided the following forecasts on 20 December 2021. These are forecasts for certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80 bps.

Link Group Interest Rate View 20.12.21															
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25	
BANK RATE	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	
3 month ave earnings	0.20	0.30	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
6 month ave earnings	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	
12 month ave earnings	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	
10 yr PWLB	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30	
25 yr PWLB	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	
50 yr PWLB	1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	

- 2 Over the last two years, the coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings until raising it to 0.25% at its meeting on 16 December 2021.
- 3 As shown in the forecast table above, the forecast for Bank Rate now includes four increases, one in December 2021 to 0.25%, then quarter 2 of 2022 to 0.50%, quarter 1 of 2023 to 0.75%, quarter 1 of 2024 to 1.00% and, finally, one in quarter 1 of 2025 to 1.25%.

Significant risks to the forecasts

- Labour and supply shortages prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity.
- Mutations of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed, or cannot be administered fast enough to prevent further lockdowns. 25% of the population not being vaccinated is also a significant risk to the NHS being overwhelmed and lockdowns being the only remaining option.
- The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) acts too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.

- The MPC tightens monetary policy too late to ward off building inflationary pressures.
 - The Government acts too quickly to cut expenditure to balance the national budget.
 - UK / EU trade arrangements - if there was a major impact on trade flows and financial services due to complications or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant remaining issues.
 - German general election in September 2021. Germany faces months of uncertainty while a new coalition government is cobbled together after the indecisive result of the election. Once that coalition is formed, Angela Merkel's tenure as Chancellor will end and will leave a hole in overall EU leadership.
 - Longer term US treasury yields rise strongly and pull gilt yields up higher than forecast.
 - Major stock markets e.g., in the US, become increasingly judged as being over-valued and susceptible to major price corrections. Central banks become increasingly exposed to the "moral hazard" risks of having to buy shares and corporate bonds to reduce the impact of major financial market selloffs on the general economy.
 - Geopolitical risks, for example in Ukraine, Iran and North Korea, but also in Europe and Middle Eastern countries; on-going global power influence struggles between Russia/China/US. These could lead to increasing safe-haven flows.
- The balance of risks to the UK economy: -
- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including residual risks from Covid and its variants - both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

Forecasts for Bank Rate

- 4 It is not expected that Bank Rate will go up fast after the initial rate rise as the supply potential of the economy is not likely to have taken a major hit during the pandemic: it should, therefore, be able to cope well with meeting demand after supply shortages subside over the next year, without causing inflation to remain elevated in the medium-term, or to inhibit inflation from falling back towards the MPC's 2% target after the spike up to around 5%. The forecast includes four increases in Bank Rate over the three-year forecast period to March 2025, ending at 1.25%. However, it is likely that these forecasts will need changing within a relatively short timeframe for the following reasons: -
- We do not know how severe an impact Omicron could have on the economy and whether there will be another lockdown or similar and, if

there is, whether there would be significant fiscal support from the Government for businesses and jobs.

- There were already increasing grounds for viewing the economic recovery as running out of steam during the autumn and now into the winter. And then along came Omicron to pose a significant downside threat to economic activity. This could lead into stagflation, or even into recession, which would then pose a dilemma for the MPC as to whether to focus on combating inflation or supporting economic growth through keeping interest rates low.
- Will some current key supply shortages spill over into causing economic activity in some sectors to take a significant hit?
- Rising gas and electricity prices in October and next April and increases in other prices caused by supply shortages and increases in taxation next April, are already going to deflate consumer spending power without the MPC having to take any action on Bank Rate to cool inflation.
- On the other hand, consumers are sitting on over £160bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so when will they spend this sum, in part or in total?
- It looks as if the economy coped well with the end of furlough on 30th September. It is estimated that there were around 1 million people who came off furlough then and there was not a huge spike up in unemployment. The other side of the coin is that vacancies have been hitting record levels so there is a continuing acute shortage of workers. This is a potential danger area if this shortage drives up wages which then feed through into producer prices and the prices of services i.e., a second-round effect that the MPC would have to act against if it looked like gaining significant momentum.
- It is also recognised that there could be further nasty surprises on the Covid front beyond the Omicron mutation.
- If the UK invokes article 16 of the Brexit deal over the dislocation in trading arrangements with Northern Ireland, this has the potential to end up in a no deal Brexit.

5 In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, it is likely that these forecasts will be revised again over the next few months - in line with whatever the new news is.

6 It should also be borne in mind that Bank Rate being cut to 0.25% and then to 0.10%, were emergency measures to deal with the Covid crisis hitting the UK in March 2020. At any time, the MPC could decide to simply take away such emergency cuts on no other grounds than they are no longer warranted, and as a step forward in the return to normalisation. In addition, any Bank

Rate under 1% is both highly unusual and highly supportive of economic growth.

Forecasts for PWLB rates and gilt and treasury yields

- 7 Since the start of 2021, we have seen a lot of volatility in gilt yields, and hence PWLB rates. As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is forecast to be a steady, but slow, rise in both Bank Rate and gilt yields during the forecast period to March 2025, though there will doubtless be a lot of unpredictable volatility during this forecast period.
- 8 While monetary policy in the UK will have a major impact on gilt yields, there is also a need to consider the potential impact that rising treasury yields in America could have on our gilt yields. As an average since 2011, there has been a 75% correlation between movements in US 10-year treasury yields and UK 10-year gilt yields. This is a significant UPWARD RISK exposure to our forecasts for longer term PWLB rates. However, gilt yields and treasury yields do not always move in unison.
- 9 US treasury yields. During the first part of 2021, US President Biden's, and the Democratic party's, determination to push through a \$1.9trn (equivalent to 8.8% of GDP) fiscal boost for the US economy as a recovery package from the Covid pandemic was what unsettled financial markets. However, this was in addition to the \$900bn support package already passed in December 2020. This was then followed by additional Democratic ambition to spend \$1trn on infrastructure, (which was eventually passed by both houses later in 2021), and an even larger sum on an American families plan over the next decade; this is still caught up in Democrat / Republican haggling. Financial markets were alarmed that all this stimulus was happening at a time when: -
- A fast vaccination programme had enabled a rapid opening up of the economy during 2021.
 - The economy was growing strongly during the first half of 2021 although it has weakened overall during the second half.
 - It started from a position of little spare capacity due to less severe lockdown measures than in many other countries.
 - And the Fed was still providing substantial stimulus through monthly QE purchases during 2021.
- 10 It was not much of a surprise that a combination of these factors would eventually cause an excess of demand in the economy which generated strong inflationary pressures. This has eventually been recognised by the Fed at its December meeting with an aggressive response to damp inflation down during 2022 and 2023.
- 11 At its 3rd November Fed meeting, the Fed decided to make a start on tapering its \$120bn per month of QE purchases so that they ended next June. However, at its 15th December meeting it doubled the pace of tapering so that they will end all purchases in February. These purchases are currently acting as downward pressure on treasury yields and so it would be

expected that Treasury yields will rise over the taper period and after the taper ends, all other things being equal. The Fed also forecast that it expected there would be three rate rises in 2022 of 0.25% from near zero currently, followed by three in 2023 and two in 2024, taking rates back above 2% to a neutral level for monetary policy.

- 12 There are also possible downside risks from the huge sums of cash that the UK populace have saved during the pandemic; when savings accounts earn little interest, it is likely that some of this cash mountain could end up being invested in bonds and so push up demand for bonds and support their prices i.e., this would help to keep their yields down. How this will interplay with the Bank of England eventually getting round to not reinvesting maturing gilts and then later selling gilts, will be interesting to monitor.
- 13 There is likely to be exceptional volatility and unpredictability in respect of gilt yields and PWLB rates due to the following factors: -
- How strongly will changes in gilt yields be correlated to changes in US treasury yields (see below). Over 10 years since 2011 there has been an average 75% correlation between movements in US treasury yields and gilt yields. However, from time to time these two yields can diverge. Lack of spare economic capacity and rising inflationary pressures are viewed as being much greater dangers in the US than in the UK. This could mean that central bank rates will end up rising earlier and higher in the US than in the UK if inflationary pressures were to escalate; the consequent increases in treasury yields could well spill over to cause (lesser) increases in gilt yields. There is, therefore, an upside risk to forecasts for gilt yields due to this correlation. The Link Group forecasts have included a risk of a 75% correlation between the two yields.
 - Will the Fed take action to counter increasing treasury yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
 - Would the MPC act to counter increasing gilt yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
 - How strong will inflationary pressures actually turn out to be in both the US and the UK and so put upward pressure on treasury and gilt yields?
 - How will central banks implement their new average or sustainable level inflation monetary policies?
 - How well will central banks manage the withdrawal of QE purchases of their national bonds i.e., without causing a panic reaction in financial markets as happened in the “taper tantrums” in the US in 2013?
 - Will exceptional volatility be focused on the short or long-end of the yield curve, or both?

The balance of risks to medium to long term PWLB rates

- 14 There is a balance of upside risks to forecasts for medium to long term PWLB rates.

A new era - a fundamental shift in central bank monetary policy

- 15 One of the key results of the pandemic has been a fundamental rethinking and shift in monetary policy by major central banks like the Fed, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank (ECB), to tolerate a higher level of inflation than in the previous two decades when inflation was the prime target to bear down on so as to stop it going above a target rate. There is now also a greater emphasis on other targets for monetary policy than just inflation, especially on ‘achieving broad and inclusive “maximum” employment in its entirety’ in the US, before consideration would be given to increasing rates.
- The Fed in America has gone furthest in adopting a monetary policy based on a clear goal of allowing the inflation target to be symmetrical, (rather than a ceiling to keep under), so that inflation averages out the dips down and surges above the target rate, over an unspecified period of time.
 - The Bank of England has also amended its target for monetary policy so that inflation should be ‘sustainably over 2%’ before starting on raising Bank Rate and the ECB now has a similar policy.
 - For local authorities, this means that investment interest rates and very short term PWLB rates will not be rising as quickly or as high as in previous decades when the economy recovers from a downturn and the recovery eventually runs out of spare capacity to fuel continuing expansion.
 - Labour market liberalisation since the 1970s has helped to break the wage-price spirals that fuelled high levels of inflation and has now set inflation on a lower path which makes this shift in monetary policy practicable. In addition, recent changes in flexible employment practices, the rise of the gig economy and technological changes, will all help to lower inflationary pressures.
 - Governments will also be concerned to see interest rates stay lower as every rise in central rates will add to the cost of vastly expanded levels of national debt; (in the UK this is £21bn for each 1% rise in rates). On the other hand, higher levels of inflation will help to erode the real value of total public debt.

Investment and borrowing rates

- 16 Investment returns are expected to improve in 2022/23. However, while markets are pricing in a series of Bank Rate hikes, actual economic circumstances may see the MPC fall short of these elevated expectations.

- 17 Borrowing interest rates fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England and still remain at historically low levels. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years.
- 18 On 25 November 2020, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates which had been increased by 100 bps in October 2019. The standard and certainty margins were reduced by 100 bps but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three-year capital programme. The current margins over gilt yields are as follows:-
- PWLB Standard Rate is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
 - PWLB Certainty Rate is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
 - PWLB HRA Standard Rate is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
 - PWLB HRA Certainty Rate is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
 - Local Infrastructure Rate is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)
- 19 Borrowing for capital expenditure. The Link Group long-term (beyond 10 years), forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%. As some PWLB certainty rates are currently below 2.00%, there remains value in considering long-term borrowing from the PWLB where appropriate. Temporary borrowing rates are likely, however, to remain near Bank Rate and may also prove attractive as part of a balanced debt portfolio. In addition, there are also some cheap alternative sources of long-term borrowing if an authority is seeking to avoid a “cost of carry” but also wishes to mitigate future re-financing risk.
- 20 While this authority will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure, there will be a cost of carry, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances.